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the Republic of Korea (ROK), and presents a new framework for modernizing EUSA's role to reflect the contemporary environment that prompted the Obama Administration's "rebalance to the Asia-Pacific." The framework requires an understanding of the historical basis for the US-ROK mutual defense treaty, and an analysis of changes in the security environment that have transpired since the end of the Cold War. New notions of cooperative and asymmetric security in the region can then be introduced as a means of transforming EUSA from a ROK internally-oriented deterrent force to an externally-oriented asset for building partner capacity in the entire Asia-Pacific region.
Due to the current obstacles with leveraging EUSA's capabilities as a Landpower, the strategic leadership of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) Commanding General (CG) will be essential in enabling EUSA to transform. The end result will be a more efficient utilization of the army in the Asia Pacific towards maintaining the United States' global leadership for the long-term.
U.S. Army's Role in the Asia-Pacific: Rebalancing Across the Pacific Rim
In an environment of reduced budgets, increased global commitments and tighter fiscal constraints, the United States (US) military has become a precious and limited instrument of national power. This paper examines the mission of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), and presents a new framework for modernizing EUSA's role to reflect the contemporary environment that prompted the Obama Administration's "rebalance to the Asia-Pacific." The framework requires an understanding of the historical basis for the US-ROK mutual defense treaty, and an analysis of changes in the security environment that have transpired since the end of the Cold War. New notions of cooperative and asymmetric security in the region can then be introduced as a means of transforming EUSA from a ROK internallyoriented deterrent force to an externally-oriented asset for building partner capacity in the entire Asia-Pacific region. 1 Due to the current obstacles with leveraging EUSA's capabilities as a Landpower, the strategic leadership of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) Commanding General (CG) will be essential in enabling EUSA to transform.
The end result of this transformation will be a more efficient utilization of the army in the Asia Pacific towards maintaining the United States' historical global leadership for the long-term.
History
The US bond with the ROK was formed at the end of World War II with the establishment of the 38 th parallel to divide the Korean peninsula in 1945. The US served as the master superpower to guide the future of the newly formed ROK in the south, while the Soviet Union oversaw the reconstruction of the Democratic People's Clausewitz's Trinitarian War theory provides a means for understanding these security issues and the role that the US defense treaties with the ROK, Japan, Philippines,
Thailand and Australia will play in managing regional security in the future.
Trinitarian War
According to Clausewitz's Trinitarian War, war is suspended between three magnetic poles representing the emotions of the people, the uncertainties a military commander must face, and the policies of a government. 7 It is in the relationships of each pole to the others that explains the root causes of different wars, and why different strategies were taken for each war to achieve national objectives. 8 Governments determine whether a strategy is suitable based on "the value governments place on the political object in war, and the scale of sacrifices to be made for it." 9 Military commanders determine the feasibility of a strategy based on the fog and friction inherent with going to war and what commanders assess is necessary for achieving victory. 10 The public determines whether the manner in which a strategy is to be conducted is acceptable to a society's culture and sense of values. Strategy is essentially then the development of limits and controls on war to prevent it from succumbing to its "dominant tendencies" of uncontrolled, absolute violence.
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The US-ROK MDT of 1953 was the product of extremely polarized poles between the US government, military commanders, and American public in fighting a limited war and the lack of a cohesive strategy for it. Today, the MDT serves as a military pedestal for the ROK that preserves the existing security order and promotes the security and stability necessary for a country to develop its government, military and population. 13 For the US, the MDT has become an "instrumental security asset that serves the U.S. interest in projecting power and preventing the emergence of a regional hegemony. 14 Although EUSA has been largely successful in implementing this deterrence for the last 61 years, its presence has also "made the Korean peninsula one of the world's most volatile places." 15 Consequently, the Obama Administration is reviewing the U.S. defense strategy against emerging threats as they rebalance the nation's focus from Middle East towards the growing opportunities in the Asia-Pacific. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's remark that the "new U.S. strategy to rebalance towards Asia is not designed to contain China,"
indicates an adjustment of the political objectives that form the basis of the bilateral MDTs in the region to reflect changes in the security environment. 16 Political Climate Changes China's rising dominance in the region makes the nation a key economic partner to the United States despite the potential security threats. 19 As a result, China has become the focal point of many of the U.S. security agreements and initiatives in Asia.
The Military to military partnership building will be a key aspect of executing Secretary Panetta's intent that "across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice." Hofstede's 5 Cultural Dimensions provides a means for highlighting the cultural changes in the ROK that make transforming the role for EUSA more agreeable and in the best interests of both the ROK and US.
Hofstede defines culture as the "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group of people from those of another." 25 Hofstede's 5 cultural dimensions are Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity and Long-term Orientation, which collectively can be used to distinguish 8 how different societies are inclined to organize and behave. 26 The subsequent descriptions of each dimension and their relevance to cultural climate changes in the ROK will reveal both the need and prospects for redefining overall security in the region.
Power Distance (P.D.) is the "extent to which the less powerful members of society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally." 27 As previously stated, the US' continued partnership with the ROK directly contributed to changing their institutions and mass belief systems from a large power distance rooted in dynastic rule towards a democratic ideology. However, the power distance remained larger than most western democratic countries, as the ROK maintained a strong government over civil society. This is in large part due to the necessity of maintaining legitimacy against the presence of an existential threat to the north. 28 This approach to governance led to the rise of strong and influential military institutions "to the extent that society embraced the norms and values consistent with militarism." 29 During the course of the last seven years, the ROK government has made a concerted effort to strengthen civilian-led control over the military and close the power gap with society. 30 The ROK Ministry of Defense considers these measures necessary in order to modernize a force that under the ROK-US alliance has had no significant changes for the last 50 years. The Individualism dimension refers to "the degree to which people in a country prefer to act as individuals rather than members of a group." 34 The implications of ROK cultural changes are significant for the EUSA. Rather than trying to overcome ROK reluctance to an expansive USFK in order to avoid being itself entangled in an unwanted war, it would be beneficial to all partner nations for EUSA to play an active, expeditionary role in the region. For countries that are greatly invested in their land forces for long-term security, the EUSA would serve as a major enabler to redefining the regional security environment and for building the requisite partner capacity for collective security to work.
New Notions of Security
Deterrence security has served as the fundamental element of the US' security agreements in the Asia-Pacific, and has been responsible for the bi-lateral nature of the codified mutual defense agreements. Each country had a specific adversary(ies) that they were trying to deter with US assistance, and there was no major threat to necessitate countries to enter into a multi-lateral agreements. However, the nature of deterrence is changing.
Since 9/11, China has become a dominant economic and military power in the region, and asymmetrical, dispersed violent extremist organizations (VEO) have risen.
VEO's like Al Qaeda do not respond to classic deterrence and require a significant amount of land forces on the ground to defeat. 39 During a period of global downsizing and smaller militaries, countries no longer have the full range of contingencies that these two emerging threats pose.
Cooperative Security theory postulates that nations can best preserve and protect their interests by active participation in "international institutions and frameworks that serve the common good." 40 Through cooperation, nations are able to protect more of their own interests than they would be alone. 41 Consequently, it is through these international institutions that nations can deter major aggression through the use of 
Role of Landpower
The dominant nature of the sea domain in the Asia-Pacific region combined with the lack of indigenous naval resources presents an important role for U.S. seapower.
However, EUSA, as the major Landpower in the region, has the most significant role in the achievement of the Obama Administration's national objectives. During peace, conflict and war the other domains of sea, air, space, and cyber power affect the land domain indirectly, but it is ultimately Landpower that is capable of bringing lasting permanent change. 44 "The Defense Department's current strategic guidance was driven by the approaching end of a decade of war, a changing technological and geopolitical landscape, and the national security imperative of deficit reduction." 45 DOD places a preponderance of responsibility on sea and air power to achieve national objectives as part of the rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific with the disposition of the EUSA land forces remaining relatively unchanged. However, the United States' ability to influence regions across the globe before national security challenges become unmanageable is rooted in U.S. Landpower.
During times of peace, combatant commanders employ steady state engagement strategies to bolster current relationships and reassure potential partners of U.S. commitment to conflict prevention. Prevention requires a credible land force, since it is only through the introduction of land forces that the military balance in a region can truly shift. 46 This is particularly favorable to partner nations under external threat, and is invaluable for combatant commanders in developing the close personal relationships among regional nations that facilitate the employment of land forces in a conflict. 47 For potential adversaries, the fact that "the US can rapidly put boots on the ground anywhere in the world still gives our opponents pause." 48 The increasing influence of VEOs and TCOs to destabilize a region has made the need for a large, flexible land force that is capable of deterring or defeating the enemy, door-to-door if necessary, indispensable. 49 When peace does escalate towards conflict, land forces play a crucial role for theater commanders in shaping a campaign to either de-escalate the conflict before it becomes a full-scale war or for the successful execution of a war. 50 Despite a wide range of shaping options, the "insertion of ground troops is the most tangible and durable measure of America's commitment to defend American interests, protect friends and deny aggression. 51 The employment of Landpower through land forces allows for 13 direct engagement with our partners to foster a mutual understanding from hands-on military-to-military contacts while building in our partners the ability to defend themselves.
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In the event of war, land forces can act to deter further aggression and/or bring about a decisive military outcome. The ability for land forces to occupy the land domain provides a means for managing the population and creating lasting conditions postconflict. In other words, land forces can not only seize, occupy, and defend areas; they can also remain in an area until National long-term strategic objectives are secured. General of these forces will need to leverage to overcome the cultural challenges of the Northeast Asia security environment.
Strategic Leadership
The three major categories of strategic leader roles that Henry Mintzberg outlines are interpersonal, informational, and decisional. 57 A (strategic) leader will establish their expectations for the scope of actions based on their understanding of these roles, which will impact how effective a leader is in implementing change in an organization. The strategic leader's role as resource allocator extends beyond tangible assets;
it also includes the allocation of the leader's time to areas, issues and other roles. 62 As the primary catalyst of change within an organization, how a leader divides his time between competing demands plays a significant role in how successfully an organization will change. Since time is limited, a strategic leader can improve the efficiency of his time by establishing a command climate that builds a sense of unity and empowers subordinate leaders to achieve a common goal. 63 In a multi-cultural environment where maintaining the flow of key resources requires tremendous negotiation between stakeholders, an effective command climate is a major combat multiplier. 
Conclusion
The U.S. has maintained a long-term security commitment with the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a major part of this commitment, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) has served as a forward deployed and committed force to the defense of the Korean peninsula. The current changes in the political and cultural climates in the region, however, warrant an expansion to the EUSA's role from a display of U.S. power projection to an instrument of building partner capacity. In other words, the existence of a highly pragmatic "Asian security order" blended from multiple security pathways exists" and should be leveraged to develop a multilateral system of cooperative security. 65 The primary threat with redefining the Army's role in terms of strategic flexibility within a cooperative security framework is that deep-rooted nationalism will inadvertently lead to resentment towards the U.S. for working with historical competitors and autonomy from working through international institutions. The significance of EUSA as a Landpower to mitigate this risk through face to face engagements, which can then lead to permanent changes should not be overlooked in the "Rebalance to the AsiaPacific" strategy. It is through this transformation of the Army's role in the Asia-Pacific
